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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No.  17-3564 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM R. COOK, SR., 
   Appellant 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-12-cr-00283-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer 
 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 October 4, 2018 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 29, 2019) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge  
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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William R. Cook, Sr. appeals the trial court’s sentence of twenty-four months’ 
imprisonment following the most recent revocation of his supervised release. After 
pleading guilty to one count of knowingly and willfully making false statements to the 
government, 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), Cook was sentenced to eighteen-months’ 
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Cook repeatedly violated the 
terms of his supervised release, resulting in three revocations and his consequent 
reimprisonment. Cook argues that his third term of revocation imprisonment, imposed 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), is unlawful because—when combined with his initial 
imprisonment and his previous twenty-fourth months and thirteen days of revocation 
imprisonment—it will result in an aggregate prison sentence exceeding § 1001’s sixty-
month maximum. Cook’s argument is unavailing. He misconstrues the interaction 
between the punishment for his underlying conviction and the consequences for violating 
the terms of his supervised release. We will affirm. 
I. 
 As noted, Cook pleaded guilty to one count of making false statements, for which 
he was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment followed by three years of 
supervised release. Cook’s supervised release required him to abide by a series of 
standard and negotiated conditions. Among other things, these conditions required Cook 
to avoid committing further crimes, regularly report to his probation officer, seek certain 
medical treatment, and refrain from using illegal drugs. During Cook’s plea hearing, the 
trial judge warned Cook that conditions may attach to any term of supervised release and 
discussed the consequences of violating these conditions, which include revocation and 
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reimprisonment. Cook acknowledged on the record that he understood the conditional 
nature of his supervised release. His supervised release began on September 25, 2013.  
 Cook began violating conditions of his release the next year. After the Probation 
Officer submitted an order to show cause, the Government and Cook agreed that Cook 
would enter a residential long-term drug treatment program. But Cook continued to 
violate various conditions of his supervised release, and the trial judge scheduled a 
violation hearing for November 3, 2015. Cook did not appear, leading to his arrest six 
days later.  
 The trial judge revoked Cook’s supervised release and imposed a twenty-four 
month prison sentence, followed by a new twelve-month term of supervised release. 
Within four months of his November 2016 discharge from prison, Cook again engaged in 
conduct violating his terms of supervised release. Cook admitted these violations, and the 
trial judge again revoked his supervised release.  
 Going into his second revocation sentencing hearing, Cook had been sentenced to 
a total of forty-two months’ imprisonment—eighteen months upon conviction and 
twenty-four months upon revocation of his first term of supervised release. The trial 
judge sentenced Cook to time served—thirteen days—and once again imposed a term of 
supervised release. But in a similar fashion, Cook violated the conditions of his release, 
again acknowledging his violations during an August 2017 hearing prompted by another 
petition to show cause.  
 This brings us to the revocation sentence at issue here. During his August 24, 2017 
hearing, Cook argued that the available § 3583(e)(3) revocation prison sentence is limited 
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by the interplay between 18 U.S.C. § 1001’s sixty-month maximum and the forty-two 
and one-half months to which Cook had already been sentenced between his initial 
confinement and revocation imprisonments. Accordingly, Cook contended the trial judge 
could sentence him to at most seventeen months and seventeen days of imprisonment. 
After considering briefing on this issue, the trial judge imposed a sentence of twenty-four 
months’ imprisonment, the maximum authorized by § 3583(e)(3).   
II.1 
 Cook challenges as unlawful the twenty-four month revocation imprisonment 
sentence imposed by the trial judge. Because “postrevocation sanctions” attach “as part 
of the penalty for the initial offense,” Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000), 
Cook argues that post-revocation prison sentences are cabined by the statutory maximum 
authorized by the underlying criminal statute. Put simply, Cook’s understanding of 
revocation sentencing would limit this sentence to seventeen and one-half months—18 
U.S.C. § 1001’s sixty-month maximum less the forty-two months and thirteen days to 
which Cook had already been sentenced. To conclude otherwise, Cook argues, would 
violate his constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury.  
Supervised release, and penalties for violating its terms, are attributable to the 
original offense, but it does not follow that the term of supervised release (or 
imprisonment for violating its terms) is limited by the original offense’s maximum 
                                              
1  The trial court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1). “We exercise 
plenary review over” the trial court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). United 
States v. Williams, 675 F.3d 275, 277 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Doe, 564 
F.3d 305, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
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sentence. While supervised release attaches to the original conviction, a separate statute 
governs its mechanics and outlines penalties that may result when its conditions are 
violated. Cook asks us to improperly conflate the two and impose a limitation on 
revocation imprisonment absent in the statute. 
A. 
 It is a Class D felony to knowingly and willfully make false statements to the U.S. 
Government. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 3559(a). A defendant who violates this prohibition faces 
up to sixty months in prison. Id. § 1001. 
In addition to sentencing authorized by the substantive criminal law, the court 
“may include as a part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a 
term of supervised release after imprisonment.” Id. § 3583(a). Some conditions of 
supervised release are required by statute2—others may be ordered at the discretion of the 
sentencing judge.3 The trial judge may enforce these conditions by revoking a violator’s 
supervised release. A court may: 
revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in 
prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for 
the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release without credit for 
time previously served on postrelease supervision, if the court . . . finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of 
supervised release, except that a defendant whose term is revoked under this 
paragraph may not be required to serve on any such revocation . . . more than 
2 years in prison if such offense is a class C or D felony . . .  
 
                                              
2  The defendant may not, for example, “commit another Federal, State, or local 
crime during the term of supervision.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 
3  The condition must: (1) be “reasonably related to the [§ 3553] factors”; (2) 
“involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes 
set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D)”; and (3) be “consistent with 
any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. 
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Id. § 3583(e)(3). Section 3583(e)(3) contains an unambiguous “per revocation limit on 
revocation imprisonment.” United States v. Williams, 675 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting United States v. Hampton, 633 F.3d 334, 341 (5th Cir. 2011)).  
The sentencing judge may impose a new term of supervised release to follow such 
a period of revocation imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). Any subsequent term of 
supervised release may not exceed the amount of supervised release originally authorized 
“less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.” 
Id. This so-called supervised release tail, therefore, “progressively diminishes by the 
length of successive terms of post-revocation imprisonment.” Williams, 675 F.3d at 279. 
Section 3583(h) functions as an effective “cap on the aggregate amount of post-
revocation supervised release a defendant may receive.” Id. at 280 (quoting Hampton, 
633 F.3d at 339).  
B. 
 As Cook correctly notes, the trial court’s authority to impose supervised release 
relates back to its sentencing power over the original conviction. See Johnson v. United 
States, 529 U.S. at 700; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (“The court, in imposing a sentence 
. . . , may include as a part of the sentence . . . a term of supervised release . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). The original sentence serves the broad deterrent, retributive, and 
rehabilitative purposes of criminal punishment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). While the 
original conviction provides the source of authority for supervised release, supervised 
release serves a distinct rehabilitative purpose—assisting “individuals in their transition 
to community life.” Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. at 709 (quoting United States v. 
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Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000)). Revocation imprisonment sanctions defendants who 
breach the supervising court’s trust by violating the terms of release. See United States v. 
Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006).  
 Supervised release, and commensurate penalties for violating it, is one component 
of the original sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). But the terms of supervised release and 
revocation imprisonment, as discussed above, are delineated in a separate statute: § 3583. 
The timing and duration of supervised release operate independently of the underlying 
criminal statute.4 Therefore a term of imprisonment “authorized under the supervised 
release statute is not limited by reference to the actual term of incarceration served by a 
defendant” under the original conviction. United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 490 (1st 
Cir. 2005). And because § 3583(e)(3)—rather than the underlying statute—provides the 
relevant limitation on revocation imprisonment, a defendant who has served the statutory 
maximum sentence may face additional imprisonment for violating the terms of 
supervised release.  
The trial court here did not err in sentencing Cook to twenty-four months of 
revocation imprisonment. As noted, the court found Cook violated conditions of his 
supervised release. His conviction under § 1001(a)(2) is a Class D felony for purposes of 
                                              
4  See United States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d 480, 487 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting the “well-
settled rule that punishment for a violation of supervised release, when combined with 
punishment for the original offense, may exceed the statutory maximum for the 
underlying substantive offense” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); cf. United States 
v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 489 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The supervised release period is an 
independent element of the sentence. It is not carved out of the maximum permissible 
time allotted for incarceration under some other criminal statute.” (quotation mark and 
citation omitted)).  
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supervised release. The twenty-four month sentence imposed by the trial court, therefore, 
is a permissible revocation sentence under § 3583(e)(3). 
Were Cook’s argument correct, a defendant sentenced to a statutory maximum 
followed by a period of supervised release—a sentence plainly allowed—could not face 
reimprisonment for violating his supervised release. But this result not only undermines 
the purpose of supervised release, it does violence to the statutory scheme. As the 
Seventh Circuit observed, Cook’s suggested limitation would mean, in enacting § 
3853(e)(3), “Congress authorized a punishment that could never be imposed.” United 
States v. McIntosh, 630 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation omitted). 
There is no statutory cap that limits aggregate revocation imprisonment. Cook 
contends that the underlying maximum sentence cabins revocation imprisonment 
sentences, arguing in effect that each term of revocation imprisonment depletes 
imprisonment time available for assessment against future supervised release violations. 
We rejected a similar argument in Williams when we construed § 3583(e)(3) revocation 
imprisonment to be limited by its fixed terms and not by subsection (h)’s diminishing 
period of supervised release. See 675 F.3d at 279. Nothing in § 3583(e)(3) progressively 
reduces the available revocation imprisonment sentence. The supervised release tail may 
have such an indirect effect by virtue of the fact that revocation imprisonment necessarily 
follows supervised release. But Congress limited its direct application to the aggregate 
period of supervised release.5 
                                              
5  And if there were any doubt, Congress answered it by enacting the PROTECT 
Act, which amended § 3583(e)(3) to include the phrase “on any such revocation.” 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act 
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C. 
 Cook also contends the trial court’s judgment violated his Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights. Whether or not Cook’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment arguments were 
properly preserved, both fail on the merits. The trial court’s application of § 3583(e)(3) to 
Cook’s circumstances did not violate his constitutional rights. 
 The court’s revocation sentence did not violate Cook’s Fifth Amendment due 
process rights. Cook argues that he “didn’t have notice of” the fact that continued 
violations of his supervised release might result in aggregate imprisonment exceeding 18 
U.S.C. § 1001’s sixty-month maximum. A. 227–228. But his plea colloquy proves 
otherwise. The trial court advised Cook of the possibility that his prison sentence would 
be followed by a period of conditional supervised release, which may be modified or 
revoked. In particular, the court cautioned that it “may also revoke [Cook’s] term of 
supervised release and [he] may be ordered to serve in prison all of the term of the 
supervised release authorized by the statute for the offense that resulted in such term of 
supervised release without any credit for time [he] already served on the term of 
supervised release.” A. 52. Cook responded that he understood these consequences of 
violating conditions of release. The record belies any claim that Cook lacked adequate 
notice of the possibility of revocation imprisonment. 
 Nor did the revocation sentence violate Cook’s Sixth Amendment rights. Cook 
                                              
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650. This put an end to the practice of aggregating 
post-revocation prison sentences. See United States v. Lewis, 519 F.3d 822, 824–25 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (noting that the PROTECT Act amendments make clear that a fixed, per 
revocation maximum applies). 
10 
says that this revocation sentence violates his Sixth Amendment rights because—when 
aggregated with previous time served—it causes his sentence to exceed § 1001’s sixty-
month maximum. The revocation sentence was imposed only after the trial judge found, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that Cook violated the terms of his release. These 
two features of his reimprisonment, Cook contends, combine to violate Apprendi’s 
requirement that facts that increase a criminal penalty beyond the statutory maximum 
must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 490 (2000). 
 Cook does not question the principle that “the rule in Apprendi does not apply to a 
sentence imposed under § 3583 following the revocation of a supervised release.” 
McIntosh, 630 F.3d at 703; see also Dees, 467 F.3d at 854 (rejecting defendant’s 
Apprendi claim and noting “[t]he statutory maximum for each term of supervised release 
can be imposed upon revocation”) (emphasis in original). This is because—as Cook 
himself emphasizes—a revocation sentence is not a stand-alone criminal punishment. 
Rather, conditional supervised release and reimprisonment for violating it are part of the 
original sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583; see also United States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d 480, 
487 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[A] violation of the conditions of supervised release does not 
constitute a new crime, and the revocation of supervised release is not properly 
considered a new punishment.”) (citing Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. at 700). 
Cook does not object to his first two revocation sentences. He only challenges the 
revocation sentence that pushes his aggregate sentence beyond the sixty-month 
maximum. But the nature of this revocation sentence is the same as that of the previous 
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sentences: Cook violated the terms of his release, and the trial court imposed a sentence 
consistent with § 3583(e)(3). That statute imposes an independent limit on each 
revocation sentence and contains no aggregating principle. We reject Cook’s Apprendi 
challenge. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the revocation sentence. 
